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ABSTRACT
Sometimes it’s reasonable to reduce confidence in a proposition in response
to gaining etiological information. Suppose, for example, a theist learns that
her theism is ‘due to’ her religious upbringing. There is a clear range of cases
where it would be reasonable (≈blameless) for her to respond by slightly
decreasing her confidence in God’s existence. So long as reasonability and
justification are distinct, this reasonability claim would appear consistent with
the thesis that this kind of etiological information cannot, all by itself, affect
one’s justification. In what follows, I argue that this is mistaken. For, even
if reasonability and justification are distinct, the reasonability of decreasing
confidence in response to etiological information must be explained in terms
of a decrease in justification. The argument to follow threatens not only the
stronger thesis that etiological information never defeats justification but the
substantially weaker thesis, advocated by various authors, that justification is
defeated by etiological information in only a limited range of circumstances. I
go on to show how the arguments en route to this conclusion have much wider
epistemological ramifications.
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1. The etiological challenge to belief
Each of our beliefs has an associated etiological story. These stories involve
reference to the events, times, places, people, etc. that played a causal
role in bringing about the particular beliefs we have. These etiological
explanations for ourbeliefs serve as thebackdrop toadifferent kindof story,
a story that explainswhyourbeliefs are (or arenot) epistemically justified. To
be sure, these two kinds of stories can be connected. Sometimes learning
about the etiology of one’s belief can improve one’s epistemic position.
Onemight, for example, learn that the fact that P caused one’s belief that P.
If so, one thereby learns that one’s belief was responsive to reality in a way
that ensures the truth of one’s belief. Clearly, this would typically enhance
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one’s justification for believing P. Conversely, one might learn that some
fact incompatible with P caused one to believe P. Since this is just a way of
learning that one has a false belief in P, it is a way of losing justification to
believe P. What is distinctive of this sort of etiological information is that it
entails the truth or falsehood of one’s beliefs.
Relatively little of the etiological informationwe gather about our beliefs
is like this, neither entailing that our beliefs are true nor entailing that
they’re false. Moreover, relatively little of the etiological information we
gather about our beliefs has any impact on their justification. Your hunger
may have caused you to open the food cupboard and form beliefs about
its contents, but learning that your hunger played that particular causal
role has no impact on whether or not you have justification to believe that
there are, say, cookies in the cupboard. The vast majority of non-entailing
etiological information is epistemically irrelevant.
Yet, as many have observed, some non-entailing etiological information
seems epistemically relevant.1 Consider the following case:
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Reggie believes that God exists. His reasons for believing it involve the testimony
of those he’s grown up around (who claim to have had profound religious
experiences of God) and somephilosophical arguments. Reggie has encountered
many unbelievers, and has shared his reasons for his beliefs with them. But the
unbelievers are unmoved. Now, Reggie recognizes a clear trend: those moved
by his reasons (or reasons like his) are typically those who have grown up in
religious communities where religious beliefs like his are prevalent, encouraged,
and otherwise favorably regarded. In contrast, those unmoved by such reasons
are typically thosewhohave grownup in irreligious communities or communities
of different religious persuasions. In this way, Reggie comes to know that his
particular upbringing is (partially) causally responsible for his belief in God’s
existence and that had he grown up in one of these other communities he would
not believe that God exists even if he were exposed to the same evidence.2
Examples like this can be multiplied, involving moral, political, and philo-
sophical beliefs.3
What is troubling about such cases is that one gains etiological informa-
tion which indicates that one’s belief in P was brought about in a way that
was sensitive to factors that are disconnected from whether or not P is true.
Although it is difficult to give a precise account of the nature of the relevant
1Cohen (2000), Sher (2001), Street (2006), Schoenfield (2013), Elga (2008), Schellenberg (2007), Davis
(2009), and Ballantyne (2012).
2Assume that Reggie has no particular reason to think his community has been ignoring any relevant
evidence or is in some epistemically inferior position vis-a-vis these other communities. Assume also that
Reggie has never encountered an unbeliever who could point out problems with his theistic arguments
that he didn’t have a reasonable response for.
3See footnote 1 for references to further examples.
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disconnection, two core features are commonly noted.4 First, having a
beliefwith a disconnected etiology has to dowith the evidential irrelevance
of certain causal influences on one’s belief. After all, we typically will not
cite facts about our upbringing which have exercised a causal influence
on our beliefs as evidence that our beliefs are true for the simple reason
that such facts are typically evidentially irrelevant. Second, having a belief
with a disconnected etiology has to do with the following counterfactual
claim being true of the causal influences on one’s beliefs: even if one were
exposed to the same evidence, one would lack their (degree of) belief if
those causal influences were absent. For present purposes, we can treat
these two conditions as both necessary and sufficient for a belief having
a disconnected etiology, or a ‘d-etiology’ for short. Thus, d-etiological
information is information that indicates these two conditions are satisfied.
Importantly, d-etiological information does not entail epistemic diffi-
culties. For there can be further information that neutralizes any worries
d-etiological information threatened to raise. One might have reason to
think that their belief’s particular d-etiology makes it evenmore likely to be
true. In such a case one should not only retain, but strengthen their belief.
There are surely further pieces of information we could imagine acquiring
whichwould halt anyworries arising fromd-etiological information. But the
question I’m concernedwith iswhether or not d-etiological information can
defeat justification when further neutralizing information is absent, as it is
in the case of Reggie.
The present issue has a clear connection with the currently thriving
evolutionary debunking literature, where a central epistemological ques-
tion being addressed concerns the extent to which information about
the evolutionary etiology of our moral beliefs defeats knowledge and
justification for our moral beliefs. This is a question about the extent to
which a specific kind of d-etiological information defeats a specific range of
beliefs. In contrast, we are here addressing a much more general question:
can d-etiological information about any belief defeat justification for that
belief?5
White (2010) has offered anegative answer to that question, arguing that
d-etiological information never defeats justification. Others – e.g. Schoen-
field (2013) and Elga (2008) – have only allowed d-etiological information
4In addition to the references in footnote 1 see White (2010), Schoenfield (2013), Schechter (2008), and
Elga (2008) who each draw attention to these points.
5There are other epistemological worries that have a central role in the evolutionary debunking literature.
For example, whether or not a realist conception of the nature of moral facts would allow for moral
knowledge. This is a distinct issue from the one I’m addressing here. For more on that see Clarke-Doane
(forthcoming).
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to defeat justification in a limited range of circumstances.6 After I give
the argument against White’s view (Section 3), I will show how it can be
generalized to afflict Schoenfield and Elga’s views (Section 4).
Let us first focus on White’s (2010) thesis:
J-Immunity : Gaining d-etiological information about one’s belief that P cannot, all
by itself, defeat one’s justification to believe that P.7
Several remarks are in order. First, in what follows it will be helpful to
keep in mind the distinction between propositional and doxastic justifi-
cation, which marks the difference between having all-things-considered
justification to believe P versus having an all-things-considered justified
belief in P.8 Only when it’s necessary for clarity will I explicitly employ the
‘propositional/doxastic’ terminology.
Second, here and throughout, I will be thinking of our course-grained
attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension in terms of degrees of belief
(= credences, confidences). So, when I express ideas in terms of the corse-
grained attitudes it is just for ease of expression. Whenever I do not specify
a degree of belief I will always intend the implicit degree of belief to be
high, i.e. somewhere well-above .5.
Third, defeating one’s justification for their belief in P will be taken to be
a matter of decreasing the degree of belief (or range of degrees of belief)
one has justification to have in P.9
Fourth, for simplicity, gaining d-etiological information about one’s be-
lief in P will be a matter of coming to know that one’s belief in P has a
d-etiology.
Fifth, I’m only concerned with whether or not non-entailing d-etiological
information can defeat justification. Entailing d-etiological information is
a unique sort of etiological information. The fact that sort of information
might affect justification would be unsurprising, and it wouldn’t clearly
have any implications concerning the epistemic impact of non-entailing
d-etiological information.
6Plantinga (2000) has also argued for something similar. But his arguments are narrowly focused on
whether or not theistic belief can be defeated by d-etiological information. His answer is that theism
cannot be defeated so long as it’s true. This too is challenged in what follows.
7The phrasing of this thesis is not White’s, but it is equivalent to the conclusion White draws in his (2010)
paper.
8The key difference being that propositional justification to believe P does not entail that a subject has a
belief in P. For convenience, I will assume the traditional view that having a doxastically justified belief
in P is just a matter of having a belief in P that is based on one’s source of propositional justification to
believe P. See Alston (1989), Feldman and Conee (1985), and Pollock and Cruz (1999).
9At a minimum, a decrease in a range requires a downward shift in its upper bound whether or not the
lower bound is affected.
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Six, I’m only concerned with whether or not d-etiological information
can defeat justification all by itself.10 For the most part, this ‘all by itself’
qualification will be left implicit in subsequent discussion.
Finally, notice that if J-Immunity holds, then the following holds as well:
JJ-Immunity: Gaining d-etiological information about one’s belief that P cannot,
all by itself, defeat one’s justification to believe <that one has justification to
believe P>.11
The basic idea is that if d-etiological information cannot defeat one’s
justification for the first-order claim that P, then it cannot defeat one’s
justification for the higher order claim <that one has justification to believe
P> either. For it’s unclear how d-etiological information concerning one’s
belief in P should have the effect of defeating one’s justification to believe
the higher order claim <that one has justification to believe P> while
leaving one’s justification to believe P intact (as implied by J-Immunity).
For d-etiological information concerning one’s belief in P typically isn’t
information about one’s higher-order belief <that one has justification to
believe P>. One might not have any higher order belief. Even if one did,
they remain distinct beliefs in distinct propositions, and they can have
very different etiologies as well as very different sources of justification.12
Given this, it’s hard to see what motivation there could be to think that d-
etiological information never affects one’s justification for their first-order
beliefswhichare their subjectmatter, but it does affectone’s justification for
the corresponding higher order beliefs. So, unless a coherent explanation
can be produced for thinking otherwise, we should endorse the following:
if J-Immunity is true then so is JJ-Immunity. However it’s worth noting that,
although I think this implication is right and it simplifies the argument to
follow, the core argument could be made without it.13
Much of the resistance to J-Immunity stems from reflection on concrete
cases where it seems like d-etiological information does have an impact
on justification.14 This is not problematic in itself, but it can lead to a kind
10To illustrate, suppose one’s d-etiological information came by way of information about peer
disagreement, and assume that information about peer disagreement defeats justification. Gaining
d-etiological information in that way would lead to defeat of justification if information about peer
disagreement all by itself defeats justification. But the resulting defeat is not something that gaining
d-etiological information would have brought about all by itself.
11Throughout, ‘<...>’ are used just as a visual cue for when a higher-order claim is at issue.
12For instance, one may believe that a cat is on the mat because of their perceptual experience as of a cat
on the mat, but one may believe <that one has justification to believe that a cat is on the mat> because
a broad array of epistemologists are present and have asserted one’s present perceptual experience is
a source of justification. The higher order belief is justified by testimony, while the first-order belief is
justified by perceptual experience.
13See footnote 32.
14Cohen (2000), Schechter (2008), Sher (2001), Ballantyne (2012), and Vavova (forthcoming).
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of dialectical stalemate. For, as White has shown, it can be hard to see
(a) how d-etiological information could be allowed to defeat justification
without it leading to unacceptable skeptical consequences; and, relatedly,
it can be hard to specify (b) what plausible epistemic principles explain
the defeating force of d-etiological information. A virtue of the argument
to follow is that it does not rely on concrete cases where it seems like d-
etiological information does have an impact on justification. Rather it takes
J-Immunity for granted and shows that doing so helps yield a reductio
against J-Immunity. Thus, the argument to followwill not be as susceptible
to objections grounded in the difficulty of specifying (a) and (b).
2. Reasonability and defeat
If J-Immunity is correct, then one’s justification does not decrease just as
a result of gaining d-etiological information. But even so, people have a
tendency to treat d-etiological information as if it defeated justification.
They do this by decreasing, if sometimes only briefly and to a mild extent,
their degree of belief in P upon learning (or seeming to learn) that their
belief in P has a d-etiology.15 This tendency to reduce one’s confidence
in response to d-etiological information is further evinced by the ease
with which people transition from thoughts about their beliefs having
a d-etiology to questions about whether or not one should continue to
hold their beliefs. Similarly, it’s also exhibited in the apparent legitimacy of
epistemic challenges grounded in d-etiological information. For example,
being told that you only believe in anthropogenic climate change because
you grew up in a certain political environment has an epistemic bite,
feeling like it demands that you be less confident in your belief or else
supply additional justification for it. Moreover, this tendency makes it
utterly unsurprising that Reggie, or someone in a similar position, might
decrease their confidence in God’s existence in response to gaining d-
etiological information.
Plainly, people have a tendency to treat d-etiological information as if
decreasing their confidence were an appropriate response. So wemust ask
after the normative standing of such decreased confidence.
A guiding thought should be that at least sometimes there is something
epistemically positive to say about those who reduce their confidence in
light of d-etiological information. Call such people Reducers. Even if their
reduction in confidence isn’t justified, it’s not as if d-etiological information
15I have only anecdotal evidence for this in my own case and in the case of others I’ve talked to. See the
references in footnotes 1 and 4 for further anecdotal evidence.
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was an obviously epistemically irrelevant consideration. If it were, there
just wouldn’t be an interesting question about the epistemic impact of
d-etiological information. Indeed, if there was absolutely nothing epistem-
ically positive to say about Reducers, then White’s (2010) conclusion that
d-etiological information has no epistemic impact would seem trivial and
unsurprising. But it is far from that. So if J-Immunity is correct, the question
is what positive epistemic assessment can be made with respect to those
who reduce their confidence in response to d-etiological information.
If J-Immunity is right, then justification isn’t the positive epistemic sta-
tus that Reducers typically have since J-Immunity indicates that justifica-
tion is immune to d-etiological information.16 But this is fine since there
are positive epistemic properties other than justification we can appeal
to in order to explain what’s epistemically positive about Reducers. For
justification is a matter of epistemic permissibility, and our inventory of
positive epistemic statuses is not exhausted by that notion.17 The most
obvious positive epistemic quality that applies to, at least many, Reducers
is blamelessness. Other things being equal, in cases where agents reduce
their confidence in response to d-etiological information, they are acting in
an epistemically blamelessmanner. There are different ways of being epis-
temically blameless, and one way involves being innocently misled about
what factors are epistemically relevant. For, as is commonly pointed out,
not all apparent epistemic reasons need be genuine epistemic reasons.18
Indeed, if J-Immunity is true, this is exactly how we ought to understand
what happens when Reducers reduce their confidence in response to d-
etiological information. For J-Immunity says that d-etiological information
cannot, all by itself, defeat one’s propositional justification; put differently,
J-Immunity indicates that d-etiological information concerning one’s belief
in P is not a genuine epistemic reason that has any bearing on how one
should respond to P. So in that sense d-etiological information fails to be a
16Permissivism is, roughly, the thesis that there can be a range of degrees of belief that one can take
towards a proposition (Schoenfield 2013). Lest one thinks permissivism can provide an easy explanation
for how the behavior of Reducers could be acceptable, just focus on cases where one’s existing belief
resided at the lower bound of justified credences and where one just slightly decreased their confidence
beyond this lower bound in response to d-etiological information.
17The dominant view of justification is one that identifies it with permissibility, i.e. the property of being
either optional or obligatory. As Wedgwood (2012, 274) puts it ‘...to say that a belief is justified is to say
no more than that it is permissible...’ See also Berker (2013), Goldman (1986, 59), Ginet (2005), Littlejohn
(2012, 157), Lord (forthcoming), and Pollock and Cruz (1999, 123). But whether or not this is the best way
to explicate the notion, all that matters is that justification remain distinct from blamelessness.
18Merely apparent epistemic reasons are non-genuine epistemic reasons that appear to one to be genuine
epistemic reasons. Examples of merely apparent reasons are easiest to illustrate on externalist theories
of justification (cf. Goldman 1988; Littlejohn forthcoming a). But even internalists have made space for
blamelessness in the absence of justification due to the presence of merely apparent reasons (cf. Pryor
2001, 117; Wedgwood 2002, 351). For a lengthy defense of the idea that apparent epistemic reasons
needn’t be genuine epistemic reasons see Sylvan (2015b) and Littlejohn (forthcoming a).
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genuine epistemically relevant reason for altering one’s doxastic attitudes.
Thus such information can be, at best, amerely apparent epistemic reason;
a reason that canmake one blameless in responding to it, but a reason that
nevertheless fails to affect one’s propositional justification all by itself.19
There is another way of being blameless that is relevant. Although it is
widely assumed that one can be blameless without having justification,20
justification and blamelessness do not always come apart. On the standard
view of doxastic justification, one has a doxastically justified belief in P
only if (a) one has undefeated propositional justification to believe P,
and (b) one’s belief in P is based on that which affords one propositional
justification to believe P. If condition (a) is met, then one is epistemically
permitted to believe P. If condition (b) is met, one believes P because or on
the basis of that which affords one justification to believe P. All together,
this is tantamount to claiming that one is believing the right thing for the
right (epistemic) reasons. If one does that, it’s difficult to see what grounds
there could be for claiming that one is blameworthy for believingwhat they
do.21
There are other ways of being blameless that are presently irrelevant.22
So let us use the term ‘reasonable’ to refer to agents who are blameless in
believing what they do because they are responding to apparent epistemic
reasons, regardless of whether those reasons are in fact genuine epistemic
reasons. When those reasons are genuine epistemic reasons a thinker will
be both blameless anddoxastically justified.When those reasons aremerely
apparent epistemic reasons a thinker will only be blameless. I think this
should be regarded not just as a stipulative use of the term ‘reasonable’
but as a partial explication of our ordinary (or at least a common) notion
of reasonability (excusability, understandability). But nothing will turn on
whether or not my use of the term ‘reasonable’ is to be regarded as more
than a stipulative use.23
19Does having an apparent reason R demand that one believe R is a genuine epistemic reason? Not unless
one wishes to invite objectionable overintellectualization constraints on the possession of reasons. See
Sylvan (2015a, 2015b). See also Reynolds (2013) for defense of the idea that the appearance of knowledge
doesn’t even require the concept knowledge, much less beliefs involving it.
20Alston (1989, 145), Goldman (1988), Boghossian (2008, 259), Feldman and Conee (1985, 17), Pryor (2001,
14–17), Smithies (2012, 280), Wedgwood (2002, 351), Sylvan (2015b), and Littlejohn (2012, forthcoming
a).
21So Boghossian (2008, 270) appears correct in claiming that ‘being [doxastically] justified is, at least in
part, a matter of being epistemically blameless’.
22One such way of being blameless involves a loss of one’s agency, e.g. the sort of loss endured by one
whose beliefs result from strange pills, brainwashing, psychosis, and so forth. Other things being equal,
one cannot be properly blamed in such cases.
23This account of reasonability is related to Littlejohn’s (forthcoming a) notion of excusability/rationality
and Sylvan’s (2015b) notion of substantive rationality. Both authors deny that these normative statuses
can be identified with justification.
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So even if J-Immunity is true, and thus Reducers’ reduction of confidence
isn’t always justified, Reducers clearly can be reasonable (because they are
blameless) in their particular response to d-etiological information, which
appears to them to be epistemically relevant. Let’s cement this thought in
the following way:
R-Decrease: Other things being equal, if (a) S’s degree of belief in P was justified
prior to gaining d-etiological information, and (b) S slightly reduced her degree
of belief in P just in response to gaining that d-etiological information, then S’s
decreased degree of belief in P is reasonable.24
It is important to think about the epistemic impact of gaining d-etiological
information concerning one’s belief that P that we take one’s prior epis-
temic position with respect to P into account. For this reason (a) specifies
that the prior condition is one where a Reducer’s degree of belief is justi-
fied. Additionally, (b) says that the only decreases in confidence that are
guaranteed to be reasonable are slight decreases. The reason for this is that
sometimes drastic reductions in confidence will be clearly unreasonable
responses to d-etiological information. But it is quite plausible that slight
reductions are reasonable. (How slight? I leave it to the reader to supply an
answer they find acceptable.)
The ‘other things being equal’ qualification is to accommodate factors
that could potentially crop up in connection with d-etiological information
and compromise the reasonability of believing P to only a slightly dimin-
ished degree. For instance, upon gaining d-etiological information one
might have also obtained conclusive evidence that P is false. This would
certainly have the effect of compromising the reasonability of only slightly
decreasing one’s confidence in P. Doubtless, there are other ways for a
Reducer to fail to be reasonable due to the addition of further factors. I
intend the ‘other things being equal’ clause to screen off those cases. For
there are clearly a subset of cases, like Reggie’s, where a slight reduction in
confidence upon gaining d-etiological information is indeed a reasonable
response because it seems like epistemically relevant information.
Above I arguedon thebasis of awidely shared intuition that, other things
equal, it is reasonable for thinkers to decrease confidence in response to d-
etiological information. I’ve not sought to explain that fact. This is because
it seems to be a shared presupposition among all parties to this debate.
No one I know of has argued that R-Decrease (or any similar thesis) is false
24It has been suggested to me that one must have a belief about the epistemic relevance of d-etiological
information for a reduction in confidence in response to it to be reasonable. But this would be to
introduce an objectionable high-bar on reasonability. See footnote 19.
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in the literature.25 Indeed, R-Decrease shares a certain parallel with how
externalists tend to treat concrete cases that seem to favor internalism:
they are cases that show that internalist factors canmake one reasonable in
changing one’s degree of belief, but they cannot alter one’s justification.26
3. J-Immunity + R-Decrease = Akrasia
The problemwith J-Immunity concerns its akratic implications. For it opens
up the possibility of being lead into a kind of hypocritical situation where
one fails to live up to ideals one reasonably believes one should live up to.
This turns out to be a very good reason to reject J-Immunity.
To put an edge on the problem we’ll derive a contradiction from J-
Immunity, R-Decrease, and two additional principles. The first concerns the
relationship between doxastic justification and reasonability:
(J-R Entailment) If S’s degree of belief in P is doxastically justified then S’s degree
of belief is reasonable.
This follows from the fact that doxastic justification involves the possession
of genuine epistemic reasons, which, as discussed above, is sufficient for
reasonability.
The second principle stands in opposition to doxastic hypocrisy:
(No R-Akrasia) One cannot (reasonably believe <that one has justification to
believe P only to degree n>, while reasonably believing P to a degree other
than n).27
By ‘reasonably believe <...>’, I mean something like ‘has a very high reason-
able degree of belief in <...>’. There are plausible cases of ‘akrasia’ where
one has a reasonable low or middling degree of belief <that they have
justification to believe P only to degree n> while reasonably believing P
to some degree other than n. What’s clearly problematic are cases where
one’s reasonable degree of belief in the higher order claim is very high, and
one reasonably fails to conform to it. For simplicity, these qualifications are
suppressed in what follows.28
25Ultimately, I think the epistemically problematic nature of d-etiological information is to be explained
in terms of it being evidence of unreliability (cf. Vavova forthcoming) or some other form of epistemic
risk. But these are substantive claims that I will not argue for here; R-Decrease is sufficient for present
purposes.
26Section 5 will argue that the same problem facing advocates of J-Immunity also threatens externalists.
27Here and in what follows, nmay be taken to refer to either a specific credence or to a range of them. Thus
if some form of permissivism about reasonability is true and this is permissive case for S, then n refers to
the range of credences that are reasonable for S. Because of this, the problem to follow cannot be solved
by adopting a version of permissivism.
28One referee pointed out to me that some might think facts about our psychological inabilities generate
counterexamples to (No R-Akrasia). For instance, one might reasonably believe they have justification
to believe P only to degree .865, but realize that they’re psychologically unable to believe anything to
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Anti-akratic theses along the lines of (No R-Akrasia) are common and
have been endorsed and defended by others.29 This is unsurprising, for
akrasia is a paradigmatic normative failing. Of course, the wrinkle in the
present discussion is that I’m drawing a distinction between justification
and reasonability, and not all who’ve defended anti-akratic principles have
drawn this distinction or have drawn it in just the way that I have. But even
so, defenses of anti-akratic principles have often been conducted in terms
of some natural notion of ‘rationality’.30 Accordingly, to the extent that my
notion of reasonability maps onto that ordinary notion, those arguments
can be co-oped in defense of (No R-Akrasia).31 Additionally, even if one
were to reject (No R-Akrasia) by defending the idea that akrasia is sometimes
reasonable, that will not be enough to avoid the problem to follow. One
will further have to maintain that every time (i)–(iv) (below) are satisfied,
the resulting akratic attitudes are reasonable. Those inclined to reject (No
R-Akrasia) in such a startlingly strong and potentially ad hocway can simply
treatwhat follows as adefenseof the conditional claim that if (NoR-Akrasia)
is true then a contradiction follows.
The contradiction depends on instances where each of the following
hold:
(i) S has propositional justification to believe P only to degree n–prior to as well
as after gaining d-etiological information concerning her belief in P.
such a fine degree. In such a case believing P to, perhaps, degree .86 or .87 seems reasonable. This
potential counterexample, if sound, wouldn’t threaten the overall argument against J-Immunity and JJ-
Immunity. Advocates of anti-akratic theses could accommodate the idea that our psychological abilities
(or reasonable beliefs about such abilities) are epistemically relevant by specifying that (No R-Akrasia),
and related anti-akratic principles, hold in the range of circumstances where one is psychologically
capable (or reasonably believes oneself to be psychologically capable) of bringing one’s first-order beliefs
and one’s higher order beliefs into conformity. We could then run the reductio against J-Immunity and
JJ-Immunity in that context. The resulting attack on the immunity theses would be limited of course. It
would have no impact on immunity theses that are limited to cases where one is (or reasonably takes
oneself to be) psychologically incapable of bringing one’s fist-order beliefs and one’s higher order beliefs
into conformity. But I doubt advocates of J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity would be attracted to a fall-back
position that said, basically: only in cases where one is psychologically incapable of bringing one’s fist-order
beliefs and one’s higher order beliefs into conformity does d-etiological information fail to defeat first- or
higher order justification. So making (No R-Akrasia) sensitive to facts about one’s psychological abilities
would not significantly derail the argument against J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity.
29For defense of related anti-akratic principles, see Horowitz (2014), Sliwa and Horowitz (2016), Titelbaum
(2015), Christensen (2010), Gibbons (2006, 32), Greco (2014), Goldman (1986), Feldman (2005), Bergmann
(2005, 423), Smithies (2012), Scanlon (1998), and Littlejohn (forthcoming b). For recent opposition, see
Greco (2014).
30Suppose one wanted to recast (No R-Akrasia) just in terms of blamelessness and leave it open as to
whether there can be akratic cases of doxastic justification. To do so, one would have to reject the
claim that doxastic justification entails blamelessness (see Section 2). For given that, any case of akrasia
involving only doxastically justified beliefs will therefore also be a case of akrasia involving blameless
beliefs. So if an anti-akratic thesis concerning blamelessness holds, so does a similar anti-akratic thesis
concerning doxastic justification.
31Although some of the anti-akratic principles others endorse are wide-scope principles, it’s arguably a
short step from wide-scope anti-akratic principles to narrow-scope ones. See Lasonen-Aarnio (2015).
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(ii) Prior to gaining d-etiological information concerning her belief in P, S’s
doxastically justified degree of belief in P was n.
(iii) S has a doxastically justified belief in (i) – prior to as well as after gaining
d-etiological information concerning her belief in P.
(iv) After, and in response to, gaining d-etiological information concerning her
belief in P, S decreased her degree of belief in P just slightly below n.
Before deriving the contradiction, it is important to see that (i)–(iv) are
jointly possible if J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity are true. (Those not worried
about this can skip to the case called ‘Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Argu-
ments’.)
(i) is possible and consistent with (ii), (iii), and (iv) – provided they are
also possible. (i)’s possibility is guaranteed if skepticism about propositional
justification is false and J-Immunity is true. For if such a form of skepticism
is false then it’s possible to have justification to believe P, and if J-Immunity
is true then d-etiological information needn’t defeat that justification. So (i)
is possible. And, so long as (ii)–(iv) are also possible, (i) will be consistent
with each of them. For, if (ii) is possible, (i) is consistent with (ii) because
having propositional justification for P is consistent with having doxastic
justification for P. And, if (iii) is possible, (i) is consistent with (iii) because it’s
possible to have propositional justification to believe P to degree n while
having a doxastically justified higher order belief<that one has justification
to believe P only to degree n>. Lastly, if (iv) is possible, (i) is consistent with
(iv) since it’s not a necessary condition on having justification to believe P to
degree n that one actually believe P to degree n. This is among the things
that are supposed to distinguish propositional from doxastic justification:
the former doesn’t require a belief. Thus, if J-Immunity is true, we can
conclude that (i) is possible and that (i) is consistent with (ii)–(iv) provided
they are also possible.
(ii) is possible and is consistent with (iii) and (iv)–provided they are also
possible.Unless a severe form of skepticism is true, (ii) is possible for it’s just
a claim about having doxastic justification in the absence of d-etiological
information.Moreover, if (iii) and (iv) are possible, then (ii) will be consistent
with each of them. (ii)’s consistency with (iii) is guaranteed by the fact that
it’s possible to have simultaneously justified beliefs in both first-order and
higher order claims. (ii)’s consistency with (iv) is guaranteed by the fact
that they are about one’s attitude towards P in different circumstances: (ii)
concerns one’s attitude towards P prior to gaining d-etiological information
while (iv) concern’s one’s attitude towards P after gaining d-etiological
information. Thus, (ii) is possible and, so long (iii) and (iv) are possibly true,
(ii) is consistent with each of them.
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(iii) and (iv) are possible. (iii)’s possibility is guaranteed by J-Immunity.
For J-Immunity implies JJ-Immunity (Section 1),32 which assures us that
not only can one have justified higher order beliefs prior to gaining d-
etiological information, but one can also have justified higher order beliefs
afterwards. (iv) is possible since it’s just a psychological claim about de-
creasing one’s confidence in response to gaining d-etiological information.
So (iv) is possible, and (iii) is possible if J-Immunity is true.
(iii) and (iv) are consistent. (iii)’s consistency with (iv) follows from two
plausible claims. First, it’s (logically and psychologically) possible for one to
believe (i) while decreasing one’s degree of belief in P.33 Second, having
a weakened degree of belief in P, as indicated by (iv), is consistent with
one having a justified higher order belief in (i). For in at least those cases
where (i) is true, one’s weakened degree of belief in P is itself unjustified.
And there is no motivation to maintain that unjustifiably believing P to a
degree just slightly less than n necessarily defeats one’s justified higher
order belief <that one has justification to believe P only to degree n>.34
Thus, the conclusion to draw is that (iii) and (iv) are consistent. For they
can both be true in at least those cases where one’s weakened degree of
belief in P is itself unjustified, which is just what (i) indicates. Put differently:
one’s justified higher order beliefs are not held hostage to one’s unjustified
first-order beliefs. Thus, not only are (iii) and (iv) consistent, but (i), (iii), and
(iv) are consistent too.
(i)–(iv) are jointly possible. So, given J-Immunity, not only is (i)-(iv) each
possible, but each pair involving (i)–(iv) is possible as well as the triple
involving (i), (iii), and (iv). The other remaining triples give rise to no further
concerns beyond those raised by their respective pairs.
Given this, we can safely conclude that (i)–(iv) are jointly possible if J-
Immunity and JJ-Immunity are true. For, recall, J-Immunity was needed to
32Suppose one were to reject this implication. This would not halt my argument. For all that’s needed for
it is that there be cases where instances of J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity both obtain, which is enough
to generate possible cases in which (i)–(iv) obtain. So to effectively resist my argument at this point,
one would have to argue for the thesis that there are no possible cases where instances J-Immunity
and JJ-Immunity both obtain. But notice the cost of doing this is to maintain that either d-etiological
information can defeat one’s justification for first-order claims (in which case J-Immunity is false) or it
can defeat one’s justification for higher order claims (in which case JJ-Immunity is false). This strikes
me as cold comfort for White and other advocates of J-Immunity. For I think an implicit part of White’s
paper is that we should not only think that first-order justification is immune to defeat by d-etiological
information, but so is higher order justification. Moreover, if there are higher order defeaters, then defeat
at the higher level can lead back to defeat at the lower level, which would challenge the idea that one
could keep J-Immunity but reject JJ-Immunity. See footnote 29 for advocates of higher order defeat.
33This has occasionally been opposed. For a protracted defense see Chislenko (2016).
34For more on this kind of issue see Pryor (2004, 363–365). Note that Pryor’s notion of rationality is a
structural affair among one’s beliefs and doesn’t match my notion of reasonability. For more on how
structural rationality may differ from other normative notions (like justification and reasonability) see
Sylvan (2015b).
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show both that (i) was possible and that (iii) and (iv) are consistent, while JJ-
Immunity was needed to show that (iii) was possible. So the joint possibility
of (i)–(iv) crucially depends on these immunity theses.
Talking of situations where (i)–(iv) obtain is quite abstract. Let’s make it
more concrete by considering a casewhere (i)–(iv) would putatively obtain:
TWO DOZEN (OR SO) THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
Reggie is a theist who one day hears Alvin Plantinga give his lecture ‘Two
Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments’. He understands the arguments, and does
a commendable bit of research afterwards to satisfy himself that the premises
involved in Plantinga’s arguments are adequately justified. In this way Reggie
comes to justifiedly believe in God’s existence to a strong degree, and he also
comes to justifiedly believe <that he has justification to believe that God exists
to just that strong degree>.35 Time passes. Reggie eventually goes on to interact
with many non-believers and comes by d-etiological information concerning
his belief in God’s existence (in the way described in the case called ‘Religious
Belief’ above). But Reggie never obtains any reason to think the premises of
Plantinga’s arguments are defective. So Reggie retains his justified belief<that he
has justification to believe that God exists just to a strong degree>. Nevertheless,
Reggie’s d-etiological information troubles him, causing him to suspect that
something other than his evidence ‘lies behind’ his belief that God exists. In
response to this d-etiological information, Reggie’s belief in God’s existence
weakens, falling slightly below the degree he takes himself to be justified in
having.
Trouble comes when we ask after the reasonability of Reggie’s decreased
confidence inGod’s existenceaswell as the reasonability of Reggie’s higher-
order belief <that he has justification to believe that God exists just to a
strong degree>. For it follows from (J-R Entailment) that Reggie’s justified
higher order belief is also reasonable. And, given R-Decrease, Reggie’s
weakened confidence in God’s existence is reasonable too. But then it
follows that Reggie reasonably believes<that he has justification to believe
thatGodexists just to a strongdegree>while reasonably believing thatGod
exists to a weaker degree. This contradicts (No R-Akrasia).
Notice that whatever one thinks of the case ‘Two Dozen (or so) Theistic
Arguments’, reaching the contradiction does not depend on the intuitive-
ness of the case. There is no appeal here to intuitions about concrete cases.
Rather the contradiction stems from the joint possibility of (i)–(iv) which
were defended above. The case is just meant to be illustrative of what an
instance of (i)–(iv) would look like.36
35I am assuming that in recognizingwhat reasons he had to believe God exists, Reggie was thereby gaining
justification to believe <that he has justification to believe that God exists to just some strong degree>.
36Let me highlight a certain misunderstanding I’ve encountered about this case. Some have conveyed
to me that it seems somehow problematic to think that Reggie could be reasonable in treating d-
etiological information as epistemically relevant to his first-order belief but not his higher order belief.
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So let me state in general terms how we can derive an explicit contra-
diction. Take a situation in which (i)–(iv) obtain. (ii) and (iv) ensure that
the antecedent of R-Decrease is satisfied in cases where ‘other things are
equal’. So it follows from that and R-Decrease that S’s decreased degree of
belief in P, which falls just slightly below n, is reasonably held. From (iii) and
(J-R Entailment) it follows that even after gaining d-etiological information
S reasonably believes (i), i.e. S reasonably believes <that she has justification
to believe P only to degree n>. Thus, it follows that S reasonably believes
<that she has justification to believe P only to degree n>, while reasonably
believing P to a degree other than n. But this is contrary to (No R-Akrasia).
Something has to give.
To summarize: (J-R Entailment), (No R-Akrasia), R-Decrease, and the joint
possibility of (i)–(iv) entail a contradiction. R-Decrease, (J-R Entailment),
and (No R-Akrasia) are well-motivated. So the best available response to
the above reductio is to reject the joint possibility of (i)–(iv). But there
are only two plausible ways to resist the joint possibility of (i)–(iv): deny
J-Immunity or deny JJ-Immunity. For these are the only two controversial
and intuitively problematic assumptions that were made when showing
that (i)–(iv) are collectively possible. J-Immunity was needed to show both
that (i) was possible and that (iii) and (iv) are consistent, while JJ-Immunity
was needed to show that (iii) was possible.
Sowehave reason to reject at least oneof the immunity theses. However,
it would be odd to reject J-Immunity without also rejecting JJ-Immunity
since J-Immunity is the principal motivation for JJ-Immunity. So without J-
Immunity it’s unclear what reason there would be to retain JJ-Immunity.
Conversely, the rejection of JJ-Immunity would requires us to reject J-
Immunity provided J-Immunity implies JJ-Immunity (Section 1). Accord-
ingly, a well-motivated strategy for dealing with the reductio is a unified
one: reject both immunity theses. If both are false, then d-etiological in-
formation has a double impact concerning one’s belief in P: it defeats
one’s justification to believe P as well as one’s justification to believe <that
one has justification to believe P>. But even if one wanted to avoid the
Put differently, it’s reasonable for Reggie to decrease his confidence in the first-order belief only if he
also decreases his confidence in his higher order belief.
I feel the pull of this position, but I’m doubtful that one can take this position while hanging on to
R-Decrease and the two immunity theses. For they jointly create space for one to reasonably reduce
confidence in first-order claims without also reducing confidence in higher order claims. Still, for the sake
of argument, assume that the worry is well-founded in contexts where R-Decrease and the two immunity
theses hold. The key observation to make is that we can reach a contradiction even if Reggie were to
decrease his confidence in the higher order claim. For, despite a reduction in confidence, it’s possible
that Reggie retain a very high degree of confidence in the higher order claim. Reggie just needs to be
very, very confident in the higher order claim and to only slightly reduce his confidence in it. If that were
his situation, we’d still run into trouble with (No R-Akrasia).
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above contradiction by rejecting only one of the two immunity theses, d-
etiological information would still be shown to defeat one’s justification,
be it first-order or higher order.
Given how defeat was characterized in Section 1, it follows that the
immunity theses are false just in case d-etiological information can slightly
reduce the degree of belief one is justified in holding. Since one can do that
while still having abelief (albeit aweakenedone), therewill be the suspicion
that we can reject the immunity theses while accepting White’s broader
point that d-etiological information never forces one to suspend belief. But
this is not so. For if d-etiological information defeats justification, there will
be a range of cases where one’s original justified degree of belief was close
enough to suspension that the addition of d-etiological information will
require one to suspend belief. Granted, this is perhaps not Reggie’s case.
He has at least two dozen arguments for God’s existence. But suppose he
had only one argument or only arguments with weakly justified premises.
Suspension might well be required of him.
4. The extent and explanation of d-etiological defeaters
I believe the least problematic and most intuitive response to the above
contradiction is to take it as a reductio against J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity.
Accordingly, I’murging us to think that d-etiological information candefeat
first- and higher-order justification. However, one might resist this way of
solving the problem, thinking that White (2010) has adequately motivated
J-Immunity (and hence JJ-Immunity). But this overestimates the strength of
White’s argument.White’s primary argument for J-Immunity is an inference
from absence, i.e. his defense of J-Immunity depended on the inability
to locate a satisfactory reason for thinking that d-etiological information
defeats justification. But the above reductio affords us clear motivation for
thinking that d-etiological information does defeat justification. So for the
immunity theses to stand we need some reason to think their rejection is
not the best response to the above reductio.
So far I’ve only argued that the above reductio shows us that there are
d-etiological defeaters. But how extensive are they? I’ve argued that what
makes it the case that one loses justification when one gains d-etiological
information in cases like Reggie’s just is one’s d-etiological information. If
correct, themost natural view to take away from the above reductio and its
suggested solution is this:
Extent: One has a d-etiological defeater for one’s degree of belief in P and one’s
degree of belief <that one has justification to believe P> whenever one is in
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a position to reasonably reduce one’s degree of belief in P in response to d-
etiological information.37
Anything more restrictive than this would need additional justification,
specifying certain factors that have the power to undercut the defeating
force of d-etiological information. Importantly, those undercutting condi-
tions must be inconsistent with (i)–(iv), otherwise the proposed undercut-
ting condition will allow the reductio to be re-introduced.
We can consider the search for such undercutting conditions as a search
for a suitable replacement for φ:
φ-J-Immunity : Provided φ, gaining d-etiological information about one’s belief
that P cannot, all by itself, defeat one’s justification to believe that P.
Hereare a coupleof examples. According toSchoenfield (2013), d-etiological
information does not defeat justification in permissive cases, i.e. caseswhere
there is more than one justified response to the evidence. According to
Elga (2008), d-etiological information does not defeat justification in cases
of good governance, i.e. cases where one’s d-etiological information fails to
indicate that one has failed (or is likely to have failed) to be governed by
their own epistemic standards in arriving at their belief. Thus, we can think
of Schoenfield and Elga as inspiring something like:
Permissive-J-Immunity : Provided one is in a permissive case, gaining d-etiological
information about one’s belief that P cannot, all by itself, defeat one’s justification
to believe that P.
Governed-J-Immunity : Provided one is in a case of good governance, gaining d-
etiological information about one’s belief that P cannot, all by itself, defeat one’s
justification to believe that P.38
But so long as one grants that it’s reasonable to decrease confidence
in one’s belief that P in response to d-etiological information in some
permissive cases and some cases of good governance, we will be able to
derive a contradiction from Elga’s and Schoenfield’s restricted J-Immunity
theses just as we did from the unrestricted J-Immunity thesis we began
with. For example, we could just further describe Reggie’s case so that it’s
clear that he’s in a permissive case and a case of good governance. That
is, suppose that both Reggie and the atheists he’s interacted with are in
37There is no tension between Extent and my admission in Section 1 that further information could
neutralize the threat of d-etiological information. For the kind of etiological information gestured at
there is information that would make it unreasonable for one to reduce one’s degree of belief upon
gaining d-etiological information.
38It has been pointed out to me that Schoenfield’s and Elga’s positions may not be that different. For
Schoenfield endorses J-Immunity in permissive cases because, in those cases, an agent takes her own
standards of reasoning (as opposed to other rational standards) to be the most truth-conducive. So, as
long as she is confident that she has followed her own standards – that is, as long as it is a case of good
governance in Elga’s sense – she may maintain her belief.
132 P. SILVA
a permissive case: they are each justified in taking different positions on
the existence of God;39 and, suppose Reggie has no reason to think he
has not been living up to his own epistemic standards. There is nothing
counterintuitive or inconsistent that results from augmenting the original
descriptions of the Reggie case with these further additions. So it seems
like there can be permissive cases and cases of good governance where (i)–
(iv) obtain. This is all we would need to re-run the reductio above against
Permissive-J-Immunity and Governed-J-Immunity. Accordingly, if there is
some way of restricting J-Immunity, it’s at best unclear we’ve found it.
Notice that allowing d-etiological information to defeat justification
doesn’t have anyproblematic skeptical results. For permitting suchdefeat is
consistentwith the idea thatwe can, and typically do, retain justified beliefs
upon gaining d-etiological information. For slightly decreasing one’s confi-
dence in accordance with a slight decrease in justification will not always,
and perhaps will not typically, require one to reduce their confidence to
the point of suspension of belief. Indeed, insofar as reducing one’s belief
to the point of suspension would be unreasonable in specific cases, (J-R
Entailment) implies that it would be unjustified as well. So rejecting the
immunity theses does not threaten to introduce any kind of skepticism.
Rather it promotes a kind of epistemic modesty reflected in the idea that
one ought to be less than fully certain when one becomes aware of the
d-etiological origins of one’s beliefs.
One question remains that I lack space to address. It’s an explanatory
question: why is it that d-etiological information defeats justification? I
think the answer has to do with epistemic risk of some sort. D-etiological
information is either information about some kind of unreliability (Vavova
forthcoming; DiPaolo and Simpson forthcoming). But however one spells
out the nature of the risk at issue, it should be clear that d-etiological infor-
mation indicates that your responsiveness to your evidence was accidental
in way that compromises its justification.40
5. On the separability of positive epistemic properties
In Section 3 we reached a contradiction. The contradiction followed from
commonepistemological principles togetherwith the immunity theses and
R-Decrease. The immunity theses told us d-etiological information will not
impact justification; but R-Decrease told us that d-etiological information
39A possibility that Schoenfield herself defends.
40Again, no skeptical threat follows from this for d-etiological information only decreases one’s justification,
and it can do that without destroying it outright.
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will often impact reasonability. So holding R-Decrease and the immunity
theses generates a separability claim:
(J-R Separability) It can be reasonable for one to believe P to degree n while
lacking justification to believe P to degree n.
Separability claims are all the rage in epistemology, and they have been
for quite some time. For they generate a kind of elasticity in our theories
of justification, allowing us to deal with putative counterexamples to our
principles of justification.
This is nowhere more apparent than in the internalist/externalist de-
bate. For decades, externalists have been claiming that putative internal-
ist counterexamples to externalist theories of justification are not really
counterexamples to externalism because they don’t tell us anything about
justification.41 Rather they tell us about theway internalist factors can affect
the extent to which we are blameless (≈reasonable) in shifting our beliefs
in response to internalist factors.
But externalists who take this line of argument against internalists risk
committing themselves to something like the following:
R-DecreaseIF : There are some internalist factors that can make it reasonable for a
thinker to shift one’s confidence in P below n.
J-ImmunityIF : Internalist factors cannot, all by themselves, defeat one’s justifica-
tion to believe that P.
JJ-ImmunityIF : Internalist factors cannot, all by themselves, defeat one’s justifica-
tion to believe <that one has justification to believe that P>.
If J-ImmunityIF and JJ-ImmunityIF are a part of one’s preferred externalist
theory of justification,42 then it can be shown that internalist counterparts
to (i)–(iv) will be jointly possible.43 And, just as we saw in Section 3, if
such internalist counterparts of (i)–(iv) are jointly possible, then we can
derive a contradiction from themtogetherwithR-DecreaseIF , (NoR-Akrasia)
and (J-R Entailment). To avoid contradiction, externalists who endorse R-
DecreaseIF , J-ImmunityIF , and JJ-ImmunityIF will have to reject either (No
41cf. Goldman (1988) and Littlejohn (forthcoming a).
42And it’s hard to see how it couldn’t be. For externalists want to forbid internalist factors from affording
one justification, which seems to forbid internalist factors from defeating justification as well. For one to
allow internalist factors to decrease the degree of justification one has to believe P (by defeating it) one
would thereby have to allow such factors to increase the degree of justification one has to believe ¬P.
(This is a very familiar and plausible part of Bayesian epistemology, but one needn’t be a Bayesian to take
the point.)
43Internalist counterparts to theses (i)–(iv) are theses that result from allowing internalist factors to play
the role that d-etiological information plays in (i)–(iv). Just as we were able to show that (i)–(iv) were
jointly possible if J-Immunity and JJ-Immunity were true, the internalist counterparts to (i)–(iv) can be
shown to be jointly possible if J-ImmunityIF and JJ-ImmunityIF are true.
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R-Akrasia) or (J-R Entailment). These are doubtless costs that will surprise
many externalists.44
The point is not that (J-R Separability) is false. Rather, the point is that
we cannot uncritically rely on its truth every time we need to explain away
contrary intuitions. For the reductio of Section 3 shows us that the factors
that make one reasonable cannot blithely be separated from the class of
factors which make one justified when certain counterparts to R-Decrease,
J-Immunity, and JJ-Immunity are in play.
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